The Landscape and the Multiverse: What’s the Problem? by Read, James & Le Bihan, Baptiste
Synthese
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03137-0
The landscape and the multiverse: What’s the problem?
James Read1 · Baptiste Le Bihan2
Received: 19 August 2020 / Accepted: 24 March 2021
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
As a candidate theory of quantum gravity, the popularity of string theory has waxed
and waned over the past four decades. One current source of scepticism is that the
theory can be used to derive, depending upon the input geometrical assumptions that
one makes, a vast range of different quantum field theories, giving rise to the so-called
landscape problem. One apparent way to address the landscape problem is to posit
the existence of a multiverse; this, however, has in turn drawn heightened attention to
questions regarding the empirical testability and predictivity of string theory.We argue
first that the landscape problem relies on dubious assumptions and does not motivate
a multiverse hypothesis. Nevertheless, we then show that the multiverse hypothesis
is scientifically legitimate and could be coupled to string theory for other empirical
reasons. Looking at various cosmological approaches, we offer an empirical criterion
to assess the scientific status of multiverse hypotheses.
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1 Introduction
As a candidate theory of quantum gravity, the popularity of string theory has waxed
and waned over the past four decades. Recently, the endorsement of the approach has
again faced a downturn, in light of issues such as the so-called landscape problem.
Roughly, the idea of this alleged problem is the following: while physicists originally
held out hope that string theory would allow for the derivation of the standard model
of particle physics uniquely, in fact the theory can be used to derive, depending upon
the input geometrical assumptions that one makes, a vast range of different quantum
field theories (often, the number 10500 is floated). Early hopes by string theorists for
a unique ground state hinged on the possibility that vacuum stabilisation worked only
in special cases of the wide range of possible Calabi-Yau manifolds. In fact, however,
modern analysis of vacuum stabilisation (following e.g. Kachru et al. 2003) suggests a
very broad class of possible vacua. In light of this, critics claim that the predictive and
explanatory power of string theory is lost. In response, some scholars have suggested
answering the landscape problem by positing the existence of a multiverse comprised
of different universes corresponding to the various string theory solutions.1
The purpose of this paper is to argue first that, all things considered, the landscape
problem is not a damning issue for string theory (indeed, stronger: there is no genuine
landscape problem at all), and second that, even if one were motivated to move to a
multiverse hypothesis in light of the landscape problem, the concept of a multiverse
can nevertheless be a perfectly scientific one.2 Auxiliary aims of this paper are twofold:
first, to add to the nascent philosophical literature on the landscape problem;3 second,
1 Note that the landscape problem is often associated with another distinct issue: the fine-tuning problem.
The fine-turning problem raises the question of why the values of the parameters involved in the laws of
nature, or the background geometry in the string setting, seem to be fine-tuned for life. The multiverse
hypothesis is often advanced as a way to solve the fine-tuning problem. The fine-tuning problem and the
landscape problem should be kept separate, as while the former starts by appealing the contingency of
parameters or background geometry involved in the theory under consideration, the latter points out the
tremendous size of the space of solutions of that theory. In the present article we focus on the landscape
problem only.
2 Throughout this paper, we understand a ‘scientific’ hypothesis or concept to be one which is amenable
to empirical test. This standard usage does not commit us to a Popperian falsificationist methodology (on
which more to follow).
3 Philosophical papers which address the landscape problem are Smolin (2013a), Camilleri and Ritson
(2015), Ritson and Camilleri (2015), Matsubara (2018) and Alonso-Serrano and Jannes (2019); works
discussing multiverse hypotheses more generally include Ellis (2007, 2011, 2012), Ellis and Silk (2014),
and Carroll (2019). Although we will have some critical comments to make on Smolin below, in our
view he, more than any other author, has advanced philosophical discussion of the landscape problem.
With respect to the majority of the other above papers: we take the present work, broadly speaking, to be
complementary—although this paper, as will become clear, seeks (a) a more thoroughgoing analysis of
the predictive/explanatory content of multiverse hypotheses (with particular focus on the landscape prob-




to bring out important general issues in the philosophy of science regarding multiverse
hypotheses, via the lens of the landscape problem.We argue that the landscape problem
is not a genuine problem as it relies on question-begging metaphysical assumptions
and hence does not in itself suffice to motivate a multiverse hypothesis. Nevertheless,
we elucidate the existence of two very different possible sorts of motivations in favour
of multiverse hypotheses and review more convincing reasons for defending such
hypotheses.
We focus first on the landscape as defined by Susskind (2005, p. 574)—that is,
the space of dynamically possible models of string theory (we will elaborate upon
this in more detail in Sects. 2 and 3). We then consider the idea of a landscape in
a second sense—namely, a landscape associated with a single solution, describing a
reality in which ‘bubble universes’ or ‘pocket universes’ of some kind are embedded
in a multiverse (Sect. 4), and discuss the various motivations behind such hypotheses
(Sect. 5). We then focus on motivations offered specifically by Smolin in favor of the
multiverse hypothesis, showing that they are too philosophical to establish anything
beyond doubt—however, we show that they are perfectly legitimate as guiding prin-
ciples in theory construction (Sect. 6). We then analyse different popular notions of
the multiverse to be found both in contemporary physics and philosophy, with a focus
on eternal inflation, examining their relations with empirical testability (Sect. 7).
2 String theory and the landscape
String theory is one of the best-known and most-studied candidate quantum theories
of gravity—i.e., theories which attempt to unify quantum mechanics and general rel-
ativity. In brief, the picture that string theory presents is the following. Begin with a
background ‘target space’ of some topology and geometry. On this target space, con-
sider a one-dimensional string. Quantise this string, and study its spectrum; one finds
certain excited states with the same quantum numbers as certain quantum fields—
notably, for the closed string, one finds an excited state corresponding to the graviton
(i.e., a massless spin-2 field). Now consider strings in a particular such excited state,
distributed across target space—in the non-stringy, non-quantum limit, such strings
behave as classical fields on the target space—so-called ‘coherent states’.4 Returning
to the dynamics of the string, consistency constraints on the string worldsheet man-
date that the background fields obey certain equations: if the original target space is
Minkowskian, then one finds that these background fields must satisfy (generalisa-
tions of) the Einstein field equations of general relativity, plus dynamical equations
for matter fields.5
Again for reasons of consistency, the target space of a fermionic string theory
(so-called ‘superstring theories’, due to their inclusion of supersymmetry)must be ten-
dimensional. In order to recover the phenomenology of our four-dimensional world, it
4 There are particular subtleties involved in making this precise, which warrant the urgent attention of the
philosophical community. For further discussion, see Huggett and Wüthrich (forthcoming). We set these
matters aside in the remainder of this paper.
5 See e.g. Huggett and Vistarini (2015) for a philosophical presentation.
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is typical6 to ‘compactify’ six of the dimensions of the target space—that is, to asso-
ciate such dimensions with some compact manifold. Still for reasons of consistency,
this compactification must be effected on a so-called ‘Calabi-Yau threefold’: certain
six-real-dimensional compact manifolds. There is a huge number of such manifolds;
different choices will lead to different four-dimensional matter fields.7 To add to this,
for each such choice of target space, one can introduce extra objects, e.g. D-branes,
which in turn lead to further possible configurations for the four-dimensional matter
fields. The result is that string theory is consistent with a vast range of solutions. Thus,
the string landscape is born (see Susskind 2005, 2007).
Note that, at this point, the landscape merely represents the space of solutions
(sometimes: space of ‘dynamically possible models’) of a particular physical theory.
That a theory has many solutions is not particularly new, and we will investigate later
why the situation is taken to be particularly problematic in the case of string theory. At
this stage, what matters is that physicists were initially expecting string theory to have
only one solution, an ‘old hope’ (as Matsubara 2018, p. 45 puts it), which has now
been supplanted by the landscape view that string theory will probably end up having
a huge number of solutions. Now, the nostalgia of the old hope of getting one solution
only from string theory might be taken to motivate theorists to reify the landscape into
a multiverse.8 This amounts to turning a situation of one theory having many solutions
into an extended theory taking all the solutions of the former theory to describe parts of
a multiverse, thereby gluing together what seemed to be distinct possible worlds (i.e.
possible solutions to the original theory) into amultiverse. However, before examining
in detail the concept of the multiverse and its scientific status, let us turn first to the
landscape problem, in order to examine whether this is genuinely a problem, and if
so, the nature of this problem.
3 Prediction and explanation
The landscape, understood as the existence of a plurality of solutions of string theory,
is often viewed as being problematic for string theory by undermining its predictive
power, its explanatory power, or both.9 Let us first have a look at predictive power,
before turning to explanatory power. What does it mean for a given scientific theory to
6 Though not essential, as demonstrated by brane cosmology: an approach in which our familiar four-
dimensional spacetime is regarded as being located on a hypersurface of certain codimension within a
higher-dimensional space. See Sect. 7 below.
7 An ongoing task for string theorists is to identify the appropriate choice of Calabi-Yau compactification
such that the standard model of particle physics is recovered on the four-dimensional space. One interesting
approach to this problem has deployed the tools of machine learning: see He (2017).
8 It is worth stressing that what we are countenancing here is a possible theoretical move—we are not
claiming that any theorists actually endorse this move; moreover, it is distinct from a cosmologically-
populated multiverse (more on which below). In particular, in the language which we will introduce in later
sections, the above ‘old hope’ is a rationalist motivation for a multiverse; considerations from e.g. eternal
inflation are empiricist motivations. Many early proponents of the multiverse in string theory held the latter
motivations, but it is not obvious that they ever held the former.
9 In applying this (fairly standard) distinction to the landscape problem, we follow in this section the prior
work of Matsubara (2018).
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have predictive power? One plausible answer here is the following: given the empirical
data observed thus far, we are able to identify at least one solution of the theory in
question compatible with that empirical data; such solutions can then be used to make
new predictions that could turn out (but do not have) to be correct. Note that if no
solutions of the theory under consideration were compatible with the empirical data
thus far gathered, then the theory would have no predictive power, for it would be
empirically inadequate;10 ifmultiple solutions of the theory under consideration were
compatible with the available empirical data, then, within the context of that theory,
one would face an issue of weak underdetermination.11
On this understanding, the total number of solutions of the theory under con-
sideration is irrelevant to the predictive capacities of that theory—what is relevant
is the number of solutions of the theory which are compatible with the empirical
data gathered thus far. It is worth noting that we are setting aside here questions
regarding whether the predictive capacities of a theory (and its associated class of
models) are a function of how that theory was constructed: in particular, whether
it was constructed to accommodate certain empirical data, or, rather, whether its
saving certain empirical phenomena was ‘novel’.12 Note also that our approach to
predictivity is clearly couched in the terms of the semantic approach to scientific
theories; for earlier approaches to predictivity which proceed in terms of the syn-
tactic approach to scientific theories, see Barrett and Stanford (2004) and references
therein.
To illustrate with an example our point, and this notion of predictivity, consider
two theories, T1 and T2. If T1 has one solution compatible with the empirical data
gathered thus far and no others, and T2 has one solution compatible with the empirical
data gathered thus far but 99 others which are not, then we claim that the theories
are equally predictive: the other 99 solutions of T2 are irrelevant to its predictive
capacities. On the other hand, if T2 has 100 solutions, all of which are compatible
with the empirical data gathered thus far, but it remains the case that T1 has only one
solution (which is compatible with the empirical data gathered thus far), then we claim
that, in a certain sense, T1 can be regarded as being more predictive, for it does not
face an issue of underdetermination (cf. our discussion below of predictivity tout court
versus decision-theoretic predictivity).
Now consider the landscape problem of string theory. Essentially, the prob-
lem here is the charge that string theory loses its predictive power, in light
of the great many solutions of the theory—one for each compactification and
10 There are subtle issues here. A theory might be inadequate to the entire stock of empirical data, yet
remain empirically adequate in a certain domain—think, for example, of Newtonian mechanics, or of non-
renormalisable quantum field theories (we thank a reviewer for the second suggestion). Given this, such a
theory may nevertheless still have predictive power, within that domain of applicability. With this in mind,
all of the foregoing can be relativised to a particular domain of applicability.
11 By ‘weak underdetermination’, sometimes also called ‘transient underdetermination’, we mean, fol-
lowing Ladyman (2002, Sect. 6.1), having to hand multiple distinct models, each prima facie representing
physically distinct states of affairs, and all of which being compatible with the empirical data thus far gath-
ered. By contrast, ‘strong underdetermination’ consists in having to hand multiple distinct models, each
prima facie representing physically distinct states of affairs, and all of which being compatible with all
empirical data—regardless of whether it has been gathered thus far.
12 See e.g. Barnes (2018) for further discussion of prediction versus accommodation.
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choice of non-perturbative effects (e.g., configuration of branes—see above). In
light of the above considerations, it would be reasonable to be puzzled by
claims to the effect that, because of this plethora of solutions, string theory
loses its predictive power—for what is truly relevant here is whether string the-
ory has at least one solution compatible with the empirical data of the actual
world, and whether that theory can be used to make further predictions in
the actual world (we shall return to this latter issue in a moment). In this
regard, we share the puzzlement of the string theorist Michael Green, when he
says:
This supposed problem with a theory having many solutions has never been a
problembefore in science. There is a ‘landscape’ of solutions to general relativity,
yet nobody says the theory is nonsense because only a few of them describe the
physics we observe while the rest appear to be irrelevant. (Chalmers 2007, p. 44)
So, why is the existence of many solutions taken to be a particular issue in the
context of string theory? The difference in the reaction of several physicists to the
existence of many solutions might find its roots in the largely-accepted view that our
current most fundamental theories in physics are not absolutely fundamental.13 For
instance, Smolin voices this point of view about general relativity when he writes:
Why does general relativity so extravagantly overperform its job, giving not just
predictions for the actual universe but also predictions for an infinite number of
universes that never exist? The only conclusion to draw is that general relativity is
not the correct cosmological theory. It is—at the very least—to be supplemented,
either by a theory of initial conditions or by an historical explanation which
explains why such special initial conditions were picked out for realization in
the one real world. (Smolin 2013a, Sect. 2.1)
This shows a point that will become important later in this article: string theory
is sometimes regarded not only as a theory of quantum gravity, but also as a final
theory of everything. What exactly a theory of ‘everything’ should explain is of course
a contentious matter; but, interestingly, it has been claimed that it could account for
the values of the parameters involved in our fundamental equations and the values of
cosmological initial conditions (see e.g. Greene 1999; Smolin 2013a). As we shall
see, the finality claim, understood as the capacity to explain absolutely everything
about the natural world including its initial conditions and the parameters involved in
the fundamental equations, plays a central role in the difference of treatment between
string theory and (e.g.) general relativity to be found in the literature.
As we see it, much of the confusion and concern over the predictive status of string
theory is explicable with reference to a certain kind of Popperian dogma. Recall that,
for Popper, the mark of a scientific theory is that it is falsifiable (see Popper 1959)—
that is, that it is possible that empirical data be gathered which contradict the theory,
13 By ‘fundamentality’, we mean here the degree of accuracy and generality of a theory. In this termi-
nological convention, an ‘absolutely fundamental theory’ would be a final theory of everything; relative
fundamentality allows for the classification of theories as more or less accurate and general. There are many
other notions of fundamentality in physics, science, and philosophy that we do not discuss here—see e.g.
Ladyman et al. (2007), Le Bihan (2018) and Crowther (2019).
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and which thereby lead us to reject that theory. Naïvely, one might maintain that the
landscape renders string theory unfalsifiable—and therefore unscientific. But it should
be clear from the above that such is not the case—what is relevant to these concerns
is the number of models of the theory in question compatible with the empirical data
gathered thus far. The landscape does not per se speak against this problem—and
given the dearth of models of string theory compatible with the standard model (we
have yet to find a single one14), if anything there may be better grounds to claim that
string theory is already falsified, rather than being unfalsifiable.15
There is one final complication which deserves to be mentioned here. Suppose that
a theory has an infinite number of solutions which are compatible with the empirical
data gathered thus far.16 Then, it is reasonable to say that the theory makes an infinite
number of predictions, assuming that these solutions are taken to represent distinct
states of affairs. However, there is a further problem: how is an agent in the world to
weigh these different solutions in his or her own subjective deliberations about the
future? Without some well-defined measure on the relevant class of solutions, it is not
clear what this agent’s subjective future expectations should be. This issue is often
dubbed themeasure problem, which afflicts both theories with landscapes in the sense
of an infinity of solutions (as considered here), and theories with multiverses within a
given model (as considered below).17
Although we agree that the measure problem is, indeed, a genuine problem, we
suggest that clarity can be gained here by distinguishing two different senses of predic-
tivity: what we dub (i) predictivity tout court, and (ii) decision-theoretic predictivity.
The former is the sense of predictivity discussed above: a theory is predictive tout
court just in case it has at least one solution compatible with the empirical data gath-
ered thus far. This is true even for theories (or multiverse models—see below) with
infinitely many solutions compatible with such data. Such models need not, however,
be decision-theoretically predictive: we will say that a theory is decision-theoretically
predictive just in case,whenmultiple (potentially—although not necessarily—infinite)
solutions of that theory are compatible with the empirical data gathered thus far, there
is a well-defined measure over those solutions, allowing an agent in such a world to
adjudicate on the data they expect to observe in the future. Given themeasure problem,
there is no such way for an agent to weigh these different predictions from the theory
under consideration in their own deliberations about the future. Thus, we suggest that
the measure problem does not hamper predictivity tout court, but that it does hamper
decision-theoretic predictivity. Note also that, at present, the measure problem is not
a problem for string theory, for the theory does not have a large number of (known)
14 Though cf. footnote 7.
15 Of course, this is not to deny that we might still find such a solution in the future—our point is that,
the longer it is that our investigations do not yield such a solution, the less confident we might become
in its existence. It is also worth pointing out that we are setting aside here the interesting possibility of
non-empirical theory confirmation: see Dawid (2013) for the locus classicus, and Smolin (2014); Chall
(2018); Menon (2019); Dawid (2020) for discussion.
16 Is it the case that such an infinity of solutions renders the theory unfalsifiable? Not obviously—for an
infinity of solutions might be ruled out by future empirical data. Cf. our discussion in Sect. 7.1.
17 For in-depth philosophical discussion in the latter context, see Smeenk (2014).
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models compatible with the empirical data thus far gathered—quite to the contrary,
and as already discussed above, we have yet to find a single solution of this kind.
To close this subsection, turn now to the distinct claim that the landscape renders
string theory non-explanatory. In order to make progress in assessing this claim, one
must be precise about the notion of explanation at play. Focus first on the idea of
explanation as theoretical unification—that is, a ‘bottom level’ theory Tb is explana-
tory with respect to some ‘top level’ theory Tt just in case what was a coincidence in Tt
is offered someexplanation in Tb. For example, it is common tofind the claim thatwhile
the proportionality of gravitational and inertial masses is a coincidence in Newtonian
mechanics, it admits of some explanation in general relativity—the reason being that,
while the latter of these two theories does not contain, in its articulation, these notions,
consideration of the limiting relation between general relativity and Newtonian
mechanics is sufficient to derive the coincidence of gravitational and inertial masses
(seeWeatherall 2011).18 In the context of string theory, there does appear to be room to
offer explanations of this kind. For example, onemight ask: why do the standardmodel
coupling parameters, or masses, take the values that they do? One explanation that can
beoffered via string theorywould proceedby appeal to the geometry of the target space,
and choice of compactifications, which gave rise to those masses and couplings.19
Now, if onedemands an explanation in the sense of: the situation could not havebeen
otherwise, then it is clear that string theory cannot offer explanations of this kind—
for the above explanations are themselves based upon contingent properties in string
theory.20 That is to say: one can explain (e.g.) why certain standard model coupling
parameters take the values they do by appeal to certain string theory compactifications,
but why those particular compactifications obtain itself remains unaccounted for—
and said compactifications could have been otherwise. It is clear that authors such as
Smolin are seeking explanations of the fundamental, ultimate variety, rather than of the
contingent kind. But one should distinguish: features in Tt being explained by features
of Tb, versus those latter explanations being ultimate explanations. One can recognise
that the former is truewhile understanding that the latter is lacking. In his search for the
latter here (on which more below), Smolin, as we read him, effaces this distinction.21
18 Weatherall in fact argues that the mode of explanation at play here does not align exactly with e.g. Fried-
man’s unificatory model of explanation (Friedman 1974). For further discussion, see Moiraghi (2020).
19 See Read (2019) for more on this kind of explanation. Note that it is plausible that such reasoning could
also be deployed in the context of effective field theory (see Franklin 2020), in which it is claimed that
the ultimate explanation as to why certain effective field theories can be constructed is that the coupling
parameters in the associated more fundamental theories scale in the right way. Given the foregoing, it is
clear that this need not be the ultimate explanation—for one may, in turn, appeal to certain string-theoretic
geometrical properties in order to account for such field theories.
20 Further, one might be sceptical of ‘ultimate explanations’ (in the sense of ‘the situation could not have
been otherwise’) in general, for well-rehearsed reasons, e.g.: (i) What is the envisaged contrast class? (ii)
What are the background assumptions that one holds fixed for the counterfactual variations one performs
to evaluate the situation ‘otherwise’? (iii) Is it even coherent to demand an ultimate explanation which
dispenses with any contingent input? We will return to some of these matters in our discussion of Smolin
below; our thanks to Patrick Dürr for discussion on this point.
21 Popper himself recognised (see e.g. Popper 1959) that even unscientific theories (in his sense—i.e., unfal-
sifiable theories) may be explanatory: famously, he cited psychoanalysis as a case in point. In light of this,
even a Popperian who maintains (incorrectly, in our view—see above) that string theory is not predictive,
and so is unscientific, need not conclude that the theory has no explanatory virtues.
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4 From the landscape to amultiverse
FollowingWallace (2012, ch. 2), we take in this article a multiverse to be amultiplicity
of classical or quasi-classical worlds.22 In this section, we discuss the move from the
landscape problem to the existence of a (particular kind of)multiverse. The idea behind
this move is to trade multiple dynamically possible solutions for one broader solution
encompassing each of the original solutions.23 Is the positing of the existence of a
multiverse any more problematic than the original landscape problem when it comes
to predictive and explanatory power? Arguably, no—for all we have done is push the
class of models to within a particular broader model. Insofar as string theory itself can
be predictive, so too can string theory embedded in this multiverse (for note that if the
first model is empirically adequate, then so too is the second); insofar as the first model
can offer an explanation of certain coincidences in our less-fundamental theories of
physics, so too can the latter (indeed, there is a sense in which the latter offers in turn
a deeper explanation of these coincidences—for some origin of the different string-
theoretic solutions, and associated geometries, might now be postulated); insofar as
the former theory is falsifiable (because only certain subclass of the solutions of the
former class of solutions is adequate to the empirical data gathered thus far), so too is
the latter. In addition: the measure problem looms just as large in this context as in the
context discussed above. Thus, this latter multiverse does not pose a special problem
when it comes to these issues of underdetermination, and of falsifiability.
The only extra issues of underdetermination which arise after positing a landscape
of this kind occur when one compares the new multiverse solution of the original
theory, and the many possible solutions of the original theory. In this case, a new
issue of underdetermination arises, for one’s given empirical data are now compatible
with both theories. Thus, the construction of such a multiverse solution does not
generate further issues of intra-theoretic underdetermination (i.e., underdetermination
regarding which of a theory’s models correctly represents reality), but does generate
further issues of inter-theoretic underdetermination—for one now has no means of
ascertaining empirically which of the two theories (i.e., the original theory, or the
associated multiverse theory) is correct. (Note that, at this point, we are assuming
that the multiverse under consideration does not have distinct empirical signatures of
its own; the above issues of underdetermination would be resolved if the multiverse
model were to have distinct empirical signatures. Though we discuss this in more
detail below, it is worth noting that, in order to construct a multiverse model with
22 Here, the ‘quasi-’ is used to indicate that these worlds may be approximate and emergent entities: see
Wallace (2012, ch. 2) for discussion.
23 Note that capturing this move at the level of mathematics may require relaxing certain kinematical
constraints: for example, that the manifolds of the models under consideration be connected. (For more on
kinematical constraints, see Curiel (2016).) Of course, this is at the level of mathematics—what it would
take to represent such a multiverse in a mathematical model—rather than at the level of metaphysics.
The fact that one cannot represent such a multiverse without relaxing such kinematical constraints has no
bearing on the metaphysical possibility of a multiverse. (Cf. the response to Weatherall (2018) offered by
Pooley and Read (2021) in the context of the hole argument: even granting that one cannot use Lorentzian
manifolds to capture merely haecceitistic differences between worlds, this does nothing to speak against the
metaphysical possibility of such worlds; moreover, in this case one could represent mathematically such
worlds by relaxing the kinematical constraint that spacetime models be specified by Lorentzian manifolds.)
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distinct empirical signatures, more would need to be done than simply ‘bundling
together’ distinct models of one theory into one model of some new theory—which is
the proposal we are contemplating here.)
There is one further subtlety which deserves to be mentioned. It may be that not all
string theory solutions are realisable within the context of the multiverse cosmology
under consideration, if that cosmology is more than a mere ‘bundle of solutions’, and
has its own empirical signatures. If this is so, and the allowed class includes fewer
solutions adequate to the empirical data gathered thus far, then this latter theory would
be more predictive (if it still includes at least one ‘bubble’ adequate to the empirical
data gathered thus far), and more falsifiable.24
In brief, a multiverse has no more trouble than a landscape of solutions to account
for empirical data, when it comes to predictive and explanatory power. However, and
quite obviously, the ontological costs of a multiverse hypothesis are substantial!25
Consequently, in order to be justified in moving from the landscape to the existence
of a multiverse, one must have good—and unrelated with predictive and explanatory
power, as we just saw26—motivations to do so.27 What could those motivations be?
5 Empiricist and rationalist motivations for themultiverse
There is an interesting interplay between the motivations that one might have for
believing in a given multiverse theory, the empirical content of that theory, and one’s
prior philosophical convictions. To see this, consider first Everettian quantummechan-
ics (EQM), according to which the fundamental ontology of the physical world is
exhausted by the quantum state |ψ〉;28 different non-interacting branches of this quan-
tum state (as picked out by the process of dynamical decoherence) represent different
(quasi-)classical worlds. (For the canonical contemporary elaboration and defence of
EQM, see Wallace 2012.) Since quantum mechanics is a theory of striking empiri-
cal success, and since EQM purports to take quantum mechanics ‘at face value’ and
interpret it realistically, an advocate of this approach may argue that we have good
indirect evidence for the existence of such a quantummechanical multiverse. This one
might understand as an empiricist argument: this belief in the Everett interpretation
24 Cf. Carroll (2019).
25 At least if one is more concerned by what Lewis calls ‘quantitative parsimony’ (i.e., the sheer number
of elements in one’s ontology) than ‘qualitative parsimony’ (i.e., the number of kinds of elements in one’s
ontology). See Lewis (1986) for further discussion.
26 At least for the ‘bundle of solutions’ multiverses considered up to this point.
27 Indeed, one could even say that one must presuppose certain rationalist motivations (in the sense of
the following section) if one is to take there to be a landscape problem to begin with—as, clearly, Smolin
(2013a) does. Our thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.
28 Crucially, Everettians such as Wallace maintain that, in addition to the fundamental ontology of the
physical world (given by |ψ〉), there exists also an emergent or derivative ontology, given by a certain
functionalist strategy—see Wallace (2012, ch. 2)—or grounding strategy (Wilson 2020).
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is, ultimately, grounded in the empirical data, combined with a fairly straightforward
scientific realist methodology.29,30
One might reject the Everettian picture, based upon prior philosophical convic-
tions. Consider, for example, the pilot wave theory, according to which, in addition
to the quantum state, there exist at the fundamental level point particles (‘corpus-
cles’), with determinate positions at all times. If one imposes ab initio the requirement
that one’s physics manifest certain aspects—for example in this case, that it have
a primitive ontology of point particles—then it is clear that these requirements will
be satisfied by the pilot wave theory, but not by EQM.31 In this paper, we dub such
super-empirical requirements—i.e. requirements notmotivated solely by the empirical
data—rationalist motivations.
Thus, while advocates of EQM are guided by the empiricist motivation that one’s
ontological picture should be given by one’s best theory of science, advocates of
the pilot wave theory, while not rejecting such a view, embrace in addition certain
rationalist tendencies to impose extra requirements on one’s physics—to make that
physics ontologically perspicuous, or palatable.
Let’s be crystal clear on what we mean here by empiricist and rationalist motiva-
tions. By ‘empiricist motivations’, we mean to the attitude of sticking as closely as
possible to our best physics in our attempts to understand the ontology of theworld.We
can then commit ourselves to the existence of the theoretical entities posited by these
theories, and be justified in said commitment on empirical grounds.32 By ‘rationalist
motivations’, we mean the attitude of taking it that other a priori principles, such as
unifying principles, principles of ontological clarity (cf. again the above example of
Bohmian mechanics), or the quest for a final theory of everything, should guide and
constrain our understanding of the ontology of the world. Note that rationalist motiva-
tions are question-begging in a very literal sense: it is hard to justify them on grounds
which go beyond mere intuitions. This is not to say that rationalist motivations are not
intrinsically valuable as guiding principles. They can be used to guide and constrain
theory construction. However, in our view, to take rationalist motivations as anything
more than guiding principles is problematic, as we articulate below.
The relevance of this discussion of rationalist versus empiricist motivations mani-
fests itself in the context of cosmologicalmultiverse scenarios. Suppose that (a) one has
a cosmological theorywhich predicts amultiverse (e.g., an eternal inflationmultiverse,
discussed in further depth in Sect. 7.1); (b) such a theory (unlike the case considered in
29 For an approach seeking to make this issue of theory confirmation precise in the Everettian context, see
Greaves (2007), Greaves and Myrvold (2010).
30 Of course, there is a small dose of rationalism here, insofar as the Everettian must assume that the
simplest, most straightforward, literal ontological interpretation (consistent with one’s other metaphysical
commitments, if any) of a given theory is indeed the correct interpretation. It’s widely acknowledged that
this transcends straightforward empiricism (see e.g. van Fraassen 1980)—but we take this to be a rationalist
principle necessary for a scientific realist outlook, and thus regard it as being endorsed by all parties to
the debate considered in this section. We take the wider moral here to be that all scientific realists will be
motivated by some combination of empiricist and rationalist factors; only the most committed (and, likely,
implausible) empiricist position would embrace only the former.
31 For a pointed critique of EQM in this regard, and corresponding endorsement of the pilot wave theory,
see Maudlin (2014).
32 Although cf. footnote 30.
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the previous section) does have empirical signatures; and (c) such empirical signatures
have been detected—so that the theory is empirically confirmed.33 In that case, the
situation would be analogous to the quantum mechanical case described above: one
would have empiricist motivations for believing in the existence of such a multiverse.
In response to this, one could make the claim that such a theory is unpalatable, and that
onemust construct an alternative theory subject to certain ab initio requirements—with
this theory turning out to be a one-world (i.e., non-multiverse) theory. In this case, the
latter theorist would again be guided, in our terminology, by rationalist motivations.
Suppose, on the other hand, that a multiverse theory (as in the case of the examples
discussed in the previous section) has no empirical consequences, and is taken to be
true only on the basis of super-empirical considerations—for example, the willingness
to formulate a final theory with only one solution, or the desire to account for the
otherwise unaccounted-for, and sometimes apparently fine-tuned, free parameters in
one’s theories of physics.34 In this case, the tables turn, and one is motivated to
construct themultiverse theory on the basis of rationalist principles—in this particular
example, the principle that free parameters should be explained further. By appealing to
an anthropic principle in amultiverse cosmology,35 onemight then offer an explanation
of why we observe a particular fine-tuning of the free parameters: intelligent beings
can only develop in particular universes ‘correctly tuned’ in themultiverse. In this case,
in contrast to the above, it is the single-world theorist who manifests the empiricist
motivation, and the multiverse proponent who is driven by a rationalist motivation.
The crucial factor underlying the difference in these two cases is whether the
multiverse theory under consideration has empirical content—whether that theory
contributes to empirical predictions in the actual world. If it does, an empiricist can be
motivated to accept it—in spite of its apparent ontological profligacy. Indeed, the only
reason to reject such a theory would be rationalist in nature—compare again advo-
cacy of the pilot wave theory. On the other hand, if the multiverse theory in question
does not contribute to any empirical predictions, then the only reason to introduce
that theory would itself be rationalist in nature, whereas the empiricist will remain
sceptical about that theory in this case. Thus, the tables turn vis-à-vis rationalist versus
empiricist motivations, depending upon whether the theory under question contributes
to the making of empirical predictions about the world.
Now for our own take on these matters. Although we take empiricist motivations
for positing the existence of a multiverse to be perfectly legitimate, we find, on the
contrary, rationalist motivations to be question-begging, in the literal sense: rationalist
motivations, for us, cannot be more than methodological guiding principles in theory
33 We use in this paper the Bayesian notion of confirmation, of augmenting significantly the probability
of an hypothesis of being true, which does not amount to conclusive confirmation. On the two notions
of confirmation, see e.g. Dawid (2019, Sect. 6). For further discussion of Bayesianism in the context of
multiverse scenarios, see Carroll (2019).
34 The fine-tuning of the Higgs field in the standard model of particle physics offers such an example. On
the one hand, the Higgs boson’s mass cannot be too heavy in order to give the right mass to the other fields.
On the other hand, quantum fluctuations contribute to the Higgs too, requiring the so-called Higgs bare
mass to be finely-tuned in order to yield the right mass for the Higgs.




construction, whose truth cannot be known with certainty.36 In the next section, we
examine Smolin’s arguments in favor of the existence of a landscape problem and
emphasize their rationalist—and thereby contentious—grounds.
6 Smolin’s rationalist motivations
Smolin does not defend the existence of a multiverse; on the contrary, he argues for the
claim that we live in a singular universe (see especially Unger and Smolin 2015). He
defends a view according to which the universe proceeds through successive stages,
described by theories with different laws.37 Furthermore, he claims that only the
present stage—thus the present universe—is real, his view thereby being that there
is only one universe.38 These claims are motivated by the idea that the existence of
a landscape of solutions triggers a need for explanation. In this section, we discuss
one of Smolin’s rationalist motivations that leads him to recognize the existence of
a landscape problem. In addition, we argue that the cosmological selection principle
to which Smolin appeals is similar to the anthropic reasoning used to motivate the
multiverse view.
Smolin presents three criteria for what would constitute an acceptable solution to
the landscape problem. A solution, according to Smolin, must give an explanation of
the effective laws of nature (i.e., those of general relativity and quantum mechanics)
and of their parameters as we observe them in our own actual universe. In addition,
the explanation in question should explain the improbable features of the standard
model of particle physics, which include (e.g.) the large hierarchies in scales and
dimensionless parameters and the fact that they seem to be finely-tuned to create a
universe that has highly improbable complex structures over a wide range of scales
from clusters of galaxies down to molecular biology. Finally, the hypothesis should
explain the very special initial conditions of the universe.
It is worth dwelling on this last point. Smolin takes this demand that even initial
conditions be explained to be a contemporary manifestation of Leibniz’s Principle of
Sufficient Reason (PSR):
I bring up Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason because I believe it helps
greatly to clarify the issues that we confront in seeking a solution to the landscape
problem. In particular, the principle of sufficient reason [...] tells us that laws
36 That we regard rationalist motivations as being question-begging in a literal sense does not necessarily
mean that we invariably regard them as being question-begging in a pejorative sense, as long as they are
taken to be guiding principles.
37 See also Smolin (2013b).
38 See, for example: ‘There is only one universe at a time, with the qualifications that we discuss. ... This
idea contradicts the notion of a multiverse—of a plurality of simultaneously existing universes—which has
sometimes been used to disguise certain explanatory failures of contemporary physics as explanatory suc-
cesses’ (Unger and Smolin 2015, xi). Even endorsing (what onemight dub) Smolin’s ‘cosmic presentism’, it
is hard to understand why there should not be other universes also co-existing with the actual universe, given
Smolin’s further doctrine of ‘cosmic natural selection’: that one universe can ‘seed’ multiple others, with
different laws. To our minds, the idea of cosmological natural selection would fit better with an eternalist
ontology that does not restrict the content of reality to one universe only.
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must evolve to be explained and that there must be a dynamical explanation for
the initial conditions of the universe. (Smolin 2013a, p. 26)
Smolin proposes that a string-theoretic multiverse—i.e., the packaging of all string
theory solutions into one multiverse solution of some deeper theory—does indeed
address these three matters; the rationalist motivations thereby justify endorsing a
multiverse scenario, in order to explain (a) the form of the effective laws of nature (one
set of laws per ‘bubble universe’ in the multiverse represented by some deeper theory);
(b) the parameter values in those effective theories (by appeal to certain e.g. string
theory geometries associated with each ‘bubble universe’); (c) various possible initial
conditions (by embedding each model of one theory, with its own initial conditions,
into one model of a multiverse theory). Clearly, all of these motivations are rationalist
in nature: they are reasons to embrace a multiverse in response to a landscape problem
that appears only if one subscribes to dubitable assumptions, which are not directly
related to the need to account for the empirical data in the actual world.
The central issue here is that although it is certainly true that the PSR acts as a
useful abstract principle, these successes do not establish beyond any doubt that the
PSR applies universally to the world. Trying to explain as many things as can be is of
course an essential aspect of scientific investigation, and as such the PSR is a perfectly
legitimate guiding principle in theory construction. Nonetheless, making the further
(metaphysically driven) claim that everything must have a reason exceeds the scope
of scientific practice and cannot be inferred from previous successes in the history of
physics.39
It should be clear from the foregoing, however, that appeal to a string-theoretic
multiverse is in fact not Smolin’s own preferred approach to the construction of a
PSR-satisfying physics; rather, the centrepiece of his outlook lies in the claim that
laws ‘must evolve in order to be explained’. Such a view has its own problems. For
one: the claim seems to disregard much of the extant literature on the ontology of laws
of nature. Indeed, laws of nature could be afforded a different kind of explanation
which need not have anything to do with causal/historical explanations.40 But more
generally, even ifwe do not focus on laws, it is important to note thatmany explanations
in science are not causal explanations. In general relativity, for instance, the relation
between the metric field and the matter fields can hardly be accounted for in terms of
dynamical processes unfolding in time—see Vassallo (2020). Even subscribing to the
PSR, one might take non-causal explanations to be as valuable as causal explanations
39 Here, we take ‘reason’ to mean ‘explanation’, rather than (e.g.) ‘cause’. Note also that irreducibly
chancy theories would seem to be in tension with this version of the PSR; our thanks to Patrick Dürr for
this observation.
40 Think, for instance, of the four main views of scientific laws discussed in the philosophical literature:
(1) primitivism, namely the view that laws of nature are primitive entities in a liberal sense of ‘entity’ that
cannot be explained further (see e.g. Maudlin 2007); (2) the neo-Humean view advocated by Lewis (1986,
ix) that ‘all there is in the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and
then another’, the laws being the simplest and strongest codifications of those empirical regularities; (3)
the dispositionalist view that identifies laws of nature with dispositional properties of objects and/or other
non-nomological categories of entities (Ellis 2001; Bird 2005); and (4) the DTA view that identifies laws of
nature to second-order relations of necessitation existing between first-order universals, see Dretske (1977),
Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1978, 1983). Those approaches, except for primitivism, give ahistorical
explanations for the existence of scientific laws.
123
Synthese
(see e.g. Reutlinger 2017; Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018; Wilson 2018). In that case,
one need not posit a dynamical origin for the laws of nature in order to offer some
explanation as to why those laws take the form that they do.41
In sum: onemight object to Smolin’s argument bymaintaining that there is no reason
to believe that laws of nature/parameter values/initial conditions must be explained in
the first place (although it is certainly desirable that this be the case); moreover, even if
one wants to explain the existence of these laws/values/conditions, there is no reason
to believe that this explanation must be a dynamical/causal/historical explanation.
Therefore, there is no landscape problemper se; there is, rather, a rationalistmotivation
for exploring further intellectual ideas (that there could be a dynamical explanation for
the laws and the initial conditions of the universe), without any guarantee that those
ideas must inevitably lead us somewhere.
7 Other multiverses and their scientific credentials
As we have seen, the landscape problem is an heuristic issue which could—but which
certainly need not—teach us something about reality. As we have also seen, one
possible response to the landscape problem is that we do live in a multiverse. As
should now be clear, we take this possibility to be scientific as long as the considered
multiverse scenarios lead, or could potentially lead, to an empirical signature.42 In this
section, we review briefly the prospects of popular multiverse views in order to assess
their status with respect to the making of novel empirical predictions.43
In physics, multiverses are to be found in quantum mechanics with the Everettian
approach already mentioned, in string theory with the multiverse, and in cosmology
41 Furthermore, Smolin takes for granted that time must be fundamental to the physical world—however,
many physicists and philosophers of physics working in quantum gravity believe that time might turn out
not to be fundamental. For philosophical discussion of the fundamentality of spacetime in general and time
in particular in quantum gravity, see e.g. Huggett and Wüthrich (2013); Huggett et al. (2013); Le Bihan
(2018); Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019); Huggett et al. (2020); Huggett and Wüthrich (forthcoming) and
Wüthrich et al. (forthcoming).
42 Cf. footnote 2. Note that this does not mean that all multiverse scenarios discussed below are taken
equally seriously by practicing physicists. In particular, multiverse scenarios which require novel physical
mechanisms are often set aside in mainstream theoretical physics. For example, although Penrose’s confor-
mal cyclic cosmology (discussed in Sect. 7.2 below) does have empirical signatures, it requires postulating
that all massive particles eventually decay to massless particles, so that only conformal structure matters
in the identification of past infinity with the future infinity of a previous epoch. Since, however, there is
no independent evidence to support this hypothesis, the scenario is set aside by many cosmologists. (Our
thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us to make this point.)
43 We take inspiration fromaclassification proposedbyGreene (1999), butwedonot consider all the options
he does. In particular, he considers two types of multiverse which we will set aside in the present discussion:
the ‘simulated multiverse’ and the ‘holographic multiverse’. The simulated multiverse hypothesis states that
a plurality of distinct universes are simulated on a computer—existing somewhere outside of what we regard
to be the actual world—and running what we take to be the actual world as a simulation. Insofar as this
multiverse is very peculiar in nature and would presumably require us to branch into computer science, we
choose not to discuss it in the present paper. The holographic multiverse rests on a specific interpretation of
theAdS/CFT correspondence, amathematical duality obtaining between differentmathematicalmodels that
describeworldswith different ontological structures. However, interpreting theAdS/CFT correspondence as
entailing the existence of amultiverse is quite unorthodox in the literature. For discussions of the ontological
interpretation of duality in general, see e.g. Le Bihan and Read (2018) and Butterfield (forthcoming).
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with eternal inflation, conformal cyclic cosmology, and loop quantum cosmology, to
name a few popular approaches. In philosophy, Lewis’ modal realism and Tegmark’s
Pythagoreanism offer two options. In what follows, we comment on the physical con-
nections/interactions obtaining between the different universes within each multiverse
approach—the stronger these connections/interactions, the more realistic the possibil-
ity of the empirical detection of one universe from within another (cf. Wallace 2012,
pp. 100–101).
7.1 Eternal inflation
String theory, as we saw, admits of many solutions, corresponding to different input
geometrical choices, as well as choices of non-perturbative effects. Sometimes, string
theory solutions are taken to represent parts of a cosmological multiverse scenario
known as ‘eternal inflation’, which today remains the leading hypothesis among cos-
mologists.44
Eternal inflation proposes the existence an infinity of ‘bubble universes’ emerging
from the inflation of a primordial scalar field called the ‘inflaton’ (see e.g. Freivogel
et al. 2006; Aguirre 2007; Nomura 2012). Unlike in the ‘bundle’ multiverse scenarios
considered previously, cosmologists have made several proposals for the empirical
testing of eternal inflation hypotheses (see e.g. Guth and Nomura 2012). Carroll sum-
marises the situation as follows:
In this kind of scenario, bubbles of lower-energy configurations appear via quan-
tum tunneling within a region of space undergoing inflation; these bubbles grow
at nearly the speed of light, and can contain within them distinct “universes” with
potentially different local laws of physics. The distribution of bubbles depends on
details of physics at high energies—details about which we currently have next
to no firm ideas. But we can parameterize our ignorance in terms the nucleation
rate of such bubbles and the energy density within them. If the rate is suffi-
ciently high, this model makes a falsifiable prediction: the existence of circular
features in the anisotropy of the cosmic microwave background, remnants of
when other bubbles literally bumped into our own. Cosmologists have searched
for such a signature, allowing us to put quantitative limits on the parameters of
false-vacuum eternal inflation models ...
This particular version of themultiverse, in other words, is indubitably falsifiable
for certain parameter values. (Carroll 2019, p. 6)
44 Historically, eternal inflation and string theory were developed hand-in-hand (see e.g. Kachru et al.
2003). However, there is nothing in principle to preclude a scenario like eternal inflation being realised in
other approaches to quantum gravity. Although this has not beenworked out in detail for any other particular
approach, at least some cosmologists have countenanced it:
[The eternal inflation] picture is obtained by just [using] general relativity. And all this energy scale
associated with this process is much smaller than the Plank scale, where we believe that the theory
is correct.
The only aspect you need for this particular purpose, from string theory, is a lot of different vacua,
a lot of different universes, where the vacuum energy is different. As long as that aspect stays in
whatever theory of quantum gravity, then that’s enough to keep this picture (Nomura 2016).
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However, it has also been claimed that eternal inflation does not have, at themoment,
any independent and empirical line of justification (McCoy 2015; Smeenk 2017). As
Smeenk explains, this is due not only to the difficult observational access to the early
universe, but also to the high flexibility of the inflation framework:
There are no analogs, as far as I am aware, of adding a new physical feature
as part of the model that can, like the existence of Neptune, be easily checked
by other means. This is in part due to the observational inaccessibility of the
early universe, but also to the lack of a canonical choice of the inflaton field.
Given a fixed choice for the inflaton field, discrepancies with observations would
force theorists to elaborate the model, possibly identifying new features of the
early universe in the process. At present the choice of inflationary models is too
flexible to support this kind of approach. (Smeenk 2017, p. 222)
The point, then, is that while, given a choice of inflaton field, eternal inflation may
be falsifiable, the hypothesis is not falsifiable tout court, given the great flexibility
in said choice of inflaton field. The fact that (coarsely speaking), for each choice of
empirical data, there is one eternal inflationmodel compatible with it (with a particular
choice of inflaton), means that the hypothesis is not straightforwardly falsifiable in its
entirety; it also gives rise to concerns regarding underdetermination: if the empirical
data gathered thus far is compatible with many choices of inflaton field, which is the
correct one? However, the lack of present falsifiability of eternal inflation does not
amount, to our minds, to a defect in the scientific status of the hypothesis, so long as
the research programme relies on empirical data to develop a framework consistent
with it, which could potentially in the future be more constrained by further empirical
data (for a similar line of reasoning, see Carroll 2019).45
7.2 Cyclic multiverses
Eternal inflation is not the only string-theoretic cosmological view entailing the exis-
tence of amultiverse. The branemultiverse, although also linked to the string program,
relies on a different ontology involving ‘large extra dimensions’ (the model was pro-
posed byArkani-Hamed et al. 1998; see Shifman 2010 for amore recent presentation).
This approach takes the whole cosmos to be ten- or eleven-dimensional, with specific
smaller spacetimes being certain physical hypersurfaces—‘branes’—within this larger
cosmos. Our familiar four-dimensional spacetime would be a particular brane within
this overall cosmological structure. In this approach, it is sometimes further speculated
that the big bang resulted from a collision between two different branes: this is the
cyclic brane multiverse view. Given the possibility of such collisions, the cyclic brane
multiverse entails the existence of causal connections between the pocket universes. In
turn, this model has the potential to give rise to experimental consequences, suggesting
that the brane multiverse is a testable hypothesis.
45 It is worth re-emphasising that eternal inflation scenarios face the cosmological measure problem—but




Another cyclic scenario suggested by Penrose is conformal cyclic cosmology—
see Penrose (2010) and Gurzadyan and Penrose (2013).46 This scenario does not
rely on string theory. In a nutshell, the idea behind this approach is that successive
universes (called ‘aeons’) may be connected through a conformal transformation. In
more detail: the past conformal boundary of one copy of an FLRW spacetime is glued
to the future conformal boundary of another FLRW spacetime, after an appropriate
conformal rescaling. According to Penrose, this scenario should give rise to particular
fluctuations in the CMB (due to the different behaviours of bosons versus fermions
under conformal rescalings), thereby establishing the empirical status of this cyclic
multiverse approach.
7.3 Loop quantum cosmology
Loop quantum cosmology (LQC) is a cosmological model based on a simplification
of the canonical approach to loop quantum gravity (LQG) (see Bojowald and Brahma
2016; Brahma forthcoming, and, for philosophical discussion, Huggett and Wüthrich
2018). In this approach, our universe has a twin sibling universe localised on ‘the
other side’ of the big bang. Since LQC is a cosmological model based on LQG,
LQC’s epistemological destiny is likely to be tied to LQG: if LQG were to fail some
future empirical tests, these tests would speak also against LQC.47 But the opposite
in not true, insofar as the success of LQG would not entail the truth of LQC, and
empirical tests may also tell against the latter, but not the former.
As far as we know at present, the ‘multiverse’—perhaps the expression ‘dualverse’
would be more accurate to describe situations of mirror universes—posited by LQC
might well turn out to have an empirical signature. In brief, it might well be that: (i):
LQC turn out to be the right approach to quantum gravity, (ii) the mirror universe
is not an artefact of the LQC mathematical idealisations, (iii) LQC has an empirical
signature.48 As long as these conditions can bemet, the existence of the LQCdualverse
should remain a legitimate possibility amenable to empirical test.
7.4 Modal realism and pythagoreanism
According to Lewis’ modal realism (Lewis 1986), modal statements should be anal-
ysed in the framework of possible world semantics, and this semantics’ most natural
interpretation is that possible worlds are real entities that exist in the same way as the
actual world. The very notion of actuality then becomes a purely indexical notion,
similar to the indexical ‘here’. Possible worlds are distinct, and neatly separated in a
46 We recognise that there is a danger in presenting (relatively) mainstream multiverse hypotheses (such
as eternal inflation) alongside much less mainstream multiverse hypotheses (such as conformal cyclic
cosmology). We do not wish to make any implication that these approaches are equally credible; rather, we
lay them out side-by-side in this manner in order to explore their conceptual parallels. Cf. footnote 42.
47 We cannot exclude that LQC as a model might still turn out to be a valid approximation in some contexts
even if LQG were to fail. However, it seems rather unlikely that the model could teach us a lot about the
cosmos if it were based on a false theory.
48 For a detailed account of the different possible empirical signatures of LQC, see e.g. Bojowald (2005).
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causal way: by definition, different possible worlds are spatiotemporally disconnected
and causally non-interacting.
Modal realism posits amultiverse whichmight seem to be beyond any possible kind
of empirical testing.However, it has been arguedbyWüthrich (2019) thatLewis’modal
realismmight be inconsistent with the possible disappearance of spacetime in quantum
gravity. Indeed, insofar as spatiotemporal disconnectedness is used as a criterion to
identify and distinguish between numerically distinct possible worlds, the claim that
spacetime is not fundamental within our actual world threatens modal realism: our
own actual world might fail to be part of the collection of possible worlds posited
by modal realism. Since at this stage, it cannot be excluded that a theory of quantum
gravity denying the fundamentality of spacetime49 will be borne out in the future, it
follows thatmodal realismmight turn out to be empirically falsified in the future. Does
it follow from this sheer fact that modal realism is a falsifiable hypothesis? Arguably,
yes—in which case, modal realism might be slightly more scientifically respectable
than is usually thought to be the case.50
The mathematical universe hypothesis, endorsed by Tegmark (2008), maintains
that the world is a mathematical structure, not a physical structure.51 Furthermore,
all mathematically possible structures exist in the same way as the actual world,
i.e. that mathematical structure which we inhabit. This multiverse may sound beyond
empirical testing; however, as we just saw, highly abstract metaphysical models of
reality sometimes turn out to conflict with scientific theories in unexpected ways.
Therefore, this hypothesis should be scrutinised in more detail in order to ensure that,
in principle, it could not be empirically tested.52
These approaches cover most sorts of multiverses to be found in the contemporary
literature. Except for the two last philosophical multiverses—as posited by modal
realism and the mathematical universe hypothesis—they all posit some kind of causal
connection obtaining between the various universes, which could, in principle, lead to
empirical signatures.53 And even when there are no causal connections between the
various bubble worlds as with modal realism, we just saw that empirical science might
falsify the position in question. Therefore, we should not be too quick in judging that
philosophical multiverses lie out of reach of any empirical testing.
49 Note that we use here a notion of fundamentality that has nothing to do with accuracy, but relates instead
to levels of descriptions. See Le Bihan (2018).
50 Of course, there subtleties here: onemight argue, for example, that to say that one of the basic assumptions
of a theory (or a metaphysical hypothesis) is falsifiable doesn’t necessarily render the theory/metaphysical
hypothesis itself falsifiable. For example, the view could shift: a modal realist might assert that, in fact,
spatiotemporal disconnectedness was simply the wrong way to think about distinct, causally disconnected
possible worlds. We think that this is correct—but then one would not be dealing with Lewisian modal
realism, which is our focus here. Our thanks to Patrick Dürr for discussions on these matters.
51 In the interests of charitability, we set aside initial concerns that this is a straightforward category
mistake—see Butterfield (2014) for further discussion.
52 Cf., though, footnote 50—it may be that similar concerns arise also in this context.
53 Here, we are setting aside ‘divergence’ models of branching in EQM, one consequence of which is that





Positing the existence of a multiverse in order to explain why, of all the possible
geometries and matter couplings, we live in a world with these ones, amounts to
providing a philosophical answer to a philosophical problem. But, as we have seen,
one can deny that there is anything to be explained here. Indeed, the problemonly arises
if one accepts the question-begging and a priori belief that everything must have a
reason in the scientific representation of theworld. This beliefmight be correct; but this
sort of radical rationalism cannot be established on empirical grounds only (if, indeed,
it can be established at all!). Moreover, when it comes to the particular predictive
or explanatory status of a multiverse model, one must investigate the details of the
model itself in order to assess it with respect to these desiderata: it is not the case that
multiverse models invariably fail in these respects, and, indeed, it does not appear that
such is the case when it comes to string-theoretic multiverse models. Thus, there is a
clear sense in which the landscape problem of string theory is no genuine problem at
all.
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